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Abstract 
Sol argues that innovation propensity is not a specialized adaptation resulting from targeted 
selection but an instance of exaptation because selection cannot act on situations that are only 
encountered once. In exaptation, a trait that originally evolved to solve one problem is co-opted 
to solve a new problem; thus the trait or traits in question must be necessary and sufficient to 
solve the new problem. Sol claims that traits such as persistence and neophilia, are necessary and 
sufficient for animal innovation, which is a matter of trial and error. We suggest that this 
explanation does not extend to human innovation, which involves strategy, logic, intuition, and 
insight, and requires traits that evolved, not as a byproduct of some other function, but for the 
purpose of coming up with adaptive responses to environmental variability itself. We point to an 
agent based model that indicates the feasibility of two such proposed traits: (1) chaining, the 
ability to construct complex thoughts from simple ones, and (2) contextual focus, the ability to 
shift between convergent and divergent modes of thought. We agree that there is a sense in 
which innovation is exaptation—it occurs when an existing object or behaviour is adapted to new 
needs or tastes—and refer to a mathematical model of biological and cultural exaltation. We 
conclude that much is gained by comparing and contrasting animal and human innovation. 
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The aim of Sol’s provocative chapter is to develop a comprehensive framework for the evolution 
of animal innovation. The framework can be summarized as follows: 
• Innovation propensity is a by-product of a combination of traits including motivation, 
emotional responses, cognitive abilities, and morphological constraints. 
• These traits initially evolved for other functions and were co-opted for innovative 
problem solving through exaptation. 
• Through genetic assimilation, learned traits—such as those that underlie innovation 
propensity—may eventually become innate. 
In this commentary we discuss this framework and (as instructed by the editors) take the ball and 
run with it. 
Innovative Capacity as Exaptation 
The rationale for Sol’s argument (that innovation propensity is not a specialized adaptation 
resulting from targeted selection but an instance of exaptation, i.e., a by-product of selection for 
other traits) is that selection cannot act on situations that are only encountered once. (You only 
have to innovate once because if you encounter that situation again you can simply remember 
what you did the first time.) He proposes that all natural selection can do to prepare you to seize 
the moment and act on affordances for innovation when they present themselves is provide you 
with the following general characteristics: (1) motivation, e.g., hunger may increase persistence 
in finding ways to obtain food, (2) emotional responses, e.g., neophilia versus neophobia, (3) 
cognitive abilities such as attention, discrimination, and the capacity for episodic learning, (4) 
morphological and physiological constraints on the type and diversity of motor patterns, 
including the ability to adjust actions in response to context and (5) time, e.g., a longer lifespan 
provides more time for problem solving. It is these traits, Sol argues, with their interacting 
constraints and trade-offs (which are in some cases functionally linked due to pleiotropic genetic 
effects and common physiological pathways) that have been the target of selection over the life 
history of an organism, not innovativeness itself.  
We agree that these traits contribute to the capacity to innovate. We also believe they 
contribute to the capacity to find food, find a mate, care for offspring, and so forth, yet no one 
would argue that mate-finding or offspring care are exaptations. In exaptation (sometimes called 
preadaptation), a trait that originally evolved to solve one problem is co-opted to solve a new 
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problem; the trait or traits in question must be necessary and sufficient to solve the new problem. 
Are persistence, neophilia, and so forth sufficient for innovation? Sol argues that this is so for 
innovation in animals, which he claims is generally a matter of trial and error. As researchers 
who focus on human innovation, we point out that while persistence, neophilia, and so forth, are 
necessary they are not sufficient for the strategic, logical, intuitive, insightful, and even 
therapeutic processes involved in considering and reconsidering a complex idea from different 
real and imagined perspectives until all the bits and pieces fall into place. 
Let us reconsider the starting point for Sol’s argument: that selection cannot act on situations 
that are only encountered once. Viewed at a sufficiently fine level of granularity all situations are 
new situations that have never been encountered before (as Heraclitus said, you never step into 
the same river twice). Conversely, viewed at a sufficiently coarse level of granularity, all 
situations have been encountered previously. The issue then is: do novelty-affording situations 
collectively have enough in common at some intermediate level of granularity for selection to act 
upon? For example, is there a trait (or traits) that evolved, not as a byproduct of some other 
function, but expressly for the purpose of coming up with innovative, adaptive responses to 
environmental variability itself?  
We believe the answer is yes. This position is supported by experiments carried out using a 
computational model of cultural evolution that showed that the mean fitness of ideas across a 
society of artificial agents increases with the introduction of two innovation enhancing abilities: 
(1) chaining, the ability to combine simple ideas into complex ones, and (2) contextual focus, the 
ability to shift from a convergent to a divergent processing mode when the fitness of one’s 
current actions is low (Gabora & Saberi, 2011; Gabora & DiPaola, 2012). Moreover, both 
factors—chaining and contextual focus—proved most useful in times of environmental 
fluctuation (Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). Of course, care must be taken in extrapolating from 
a simple computational model to the real world. However, the computer experiments are not the 
only source of support; Chrusch and Gabora (2014) synthesized these computational modeling 
results with findings from behavioural genetics, psychology, and anthropology to produce an 
integrated multi-level account of how chaining, contextual focus, and thereby human creative 
abilities could have evolved. 
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In short, these additions enable Sol’s basic argument to be extended from trial and error 
innovative problem solving in animals to the more complex innovative abilities exhibited by 
humans. 
The Role of Context 
Sol stresses that the extent to which an animal expresses its capacity to innovate may depend 
on the relative costs and benefits of different actions in its particular ecological context; for 
example, populations of a given species living in more variable environments tend to be more 
innovative than those in predictable environments. Thus, he says, innovativeness hinges on not 
just the environment per se, but on the animal’s interaction with its environment. We agree, and 
suggest that it has in this sense that innovation is exaptation. Gabora, Scott, and Kauffman 
(2013) developed a mathematical framework for exaptation with examples from both biological 
evolution and the evolution of cultural novelty through innovation. It is actually a quantum 
model, not in the sense of Penrose, but in the sense that it uses a generalization of the quantum 
formalism that was developed to model situations involving extreme contextuality in the 
macroworld. The state of a trait (or the starting point for an idea) is written as a linear 
superposition of a set of basis states, or possible forms the trait (or idea) could evolve into, in a 
complex Hilbert space. (For example, the basis states might represent possible ways of using a 
tire.) These basis states are represented by mutually orthogonal unit vectors, each weighted by an 
amplitude term. The choice of possible forms (basis states) depends on the context-specific goal 
or adaptive function of interest, which plays the role of an observable. (For example, in the 
context of wanting to create a playground someone turned a useless tire into a tire swing.) 
Observables are represented by self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert space. The possible forms 
(basis states) corresponding to this adaptive function (observable) are called eigenstates. In this 
model, innovative capacity did not evolve as an exaptation from some other, selected-for 
adaptive trait. Rather, innovation itself—or at least the retooling of an object or idea by 
considering it from a new point of view—is modeled as exaptation. 
The Role of Genetic Assimilation 
As Sol points out, when innovations are essential for survival, the nexus of traits underlying 
innovative capacity become canalized. A phenotypic response to an environmental condition, 
such as a learned innovative behavior, can over time be genetically assimilated, and thus innate. 
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Some limitations of innate behavior are (1) it is rather unflexible, and (2) it operates over the 
course of biological generations. Thus while some kinds of innovation may be genetically 
assimilated it is unlikely that the innovations that fuel human cultural evolution are, given that 
they can unfold spontaneously over timeframes of hours or minutes (e.g., humorous internet 
banter).  
Innovation as Viewed by the Animal Behavior Literature versus the Psychological 
Literature 
We found it interesting to compare and contrast how innovation is viewed from the animal 
behavior literature versus the psychological literature. Sol’s four stages in the innovation 
process—sampling, exploring, problem solving, and learning (by which mean means 
incorporating the solution into a behavioural repertoire)—bear some resemblance to Wallas’ 
(1926) four stages of the creative process: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. 
The notion of “sampling” appears to be related to the notion of “problem finding” (Getzels & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 1994; Runco & Chand, 1994), 
and the first two stages map onto the “generate” and explore” stages of the creative cognition 
approach (Ward, 1995). What Sol refers to as neophilia seems comparable to the human 
personality trait of ‘openness to experience’. Sol notes that innovativeness may be related to risk 
taking, and there is indeed evidence that highly creative individuals tend to take more risks 
(Merrifield et al., 1961).  
We note, however, that there are also differences in how innovativeness is viewed by these 
two fields. While Sol’s focus is squarely on innovative problem solving (e.g., opening a lid to 
find hidden food), psychologists who seek a general scientific framework for creativity often 
unite innovative problem solving under the same broad umbrella as abilities such as art-making 
and scientific theorizing. Through Sol’s chapter we came to better appreciate how by comparing 
and contrasting simple versus complex forms of innovation we sharpen our understanding of 
how new objects and forms of behavior come to be.  
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